Leibniz's Block of Marble
Leibniz’s Marble Block Against Universal Assent
G.W. Leibniz’s example of a marble block is essential because it challenges John Locke’s concept of universal assent. Leibniz argues that the truth lies within the marble block in the shape of Hercules (Leibniz 294). If the marble block had veins that outlined Hercules, the block would be predisposed to take that form rather than another. This predisposition is Leibniz’s main argument. Leibniz thinks that a sculptor, given the right tools and time, would eventually be able to crave something like Hercules (Leibniz 294). Locke would disagree with Leibniz because the veins are imperceptible. If Locke uses the marble block as an analogy for the soul, he would argue that one cannot universally assent to the veins because they are not perceived.
Locke’s definition of innate is a universally assented idea. Locke defends universal assent by using the example of children and idiots to exemplify how people do not know basic properties without reason (Locke np. 49 dp. 40). Because Locke believes one needs a reason to know, the imperceptible exists. Locke would disagree with Leibniz’s marble block by claiming that if the imperceptible veins predispose Hercules, it is only through reason. Locke would argue that “how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need reason to discover it?” (np. 52 dp. 43). Locke’s understanding of innateness is like a foundation of our knowledge (Locke np. 52 dp. 43). Locke would say that one cannot have an innate property dependent on other reasons because if innate, it should make the foundation of all our reasons.
Leibniz would counter Locke’s understanding of reason with his understanding of reflection. One can crave away at the marble and polish the figure into the truth with reflection. Reflection would be the catalyst that leads to more significant predispositions to the truth of Hercules. Reflection is how Leibniz would assert that there is no such thing as a completely blank tablet (Leibniz 294). Because one can bring out the cracks with reflection, no stone tablet is ideally in shape and order. In the same way, no human soul is perfectly blank at birth. Leibniz uses Locke’s idea of reflection as a tool for the sculptor rather than reason. Furthermore, these veins will give a predisposition to the marble block. Nevertheless, Locke and Leibniz have many similarities in their understanding of reflection. Locke and Leibniz believe all ideas come from sense and reflection.
However, Locke’s defence is that one must have some form of reason to know that something is there consciously. Locke understands that at a certain age, one comes to reason. At a certain age, the human soul can assert and understand specific topics and ideas and consent to simple ideas. Locke’s furnishing of the tablet comes from empirical factors, like seeing, hearing, reflecting and more. However, Locke thinks that the soul starts with nothing, and then one grows from it (Locke np. 49 dp. 40). This idea of growth, coming to reason and then realizing ideas are not considered innate by Locke. Even if the veins are on the marble block, one must realize they were there. Consequently, Locke would argue that It does not mean the veins are innate because there needs to be universal assent. Universal assent is the soul being conscious of it from the very beginning. If one is unaware of these veins on the marble, how can it be innate in Locke’s view? It cannot. So, this is the main point that would drive a wedge between Locke and Leibniz—universal assent.
John Locke heavily argues in favour of universal assent because if the imperceptible are innate, then anything the mind can reason about will become innate. Furthermore, Locke would argue that if Leibniz allows the unconscious to become innate, it would be impossible to differentiate between innate and experienced knowledge (Locke np. 49 dp. 40). If Leibniz’s understanding is proper, then it would cause the problem of not knowing the difference between what is innate and what is not. Locke would argue that all these different aspects of the mind would become innate, and Leibniz would not be able to differentiate.
However, Leibniz’s main point is that the outline these veins form causes predispositions. To show that the imperceptible can be innate, Leibniz uses the waves as an example. Leibniz’s idea is that when one goes to the sea, hundreds of thousands of sounds come from the crash of a wave(Leibniz 295). All these smaller waves make imperceptible sounds to the ear that make up one crashing sound(Leibniz 295). However, in that sound, in that wave, there are a hundred thousand, a million other sounds that make up that one sound that one perceives.. All of these imperceptible veins create one outline that we are bound to sense with the help of reflection. The best way to think of reflection is with another example.
The example I would give to explain Leibniz’s position on the innate against Locke would be a foggy mirror. Locke may argue that a foggy mirror is no longer a mirror because there is no reflection. Leibniz would counter that the mirror is more predisposed to reflection because it has innate properties with polishing. Before one can imagine the mirror and before one can even think of polishing the mirror. The importance lies in this idea of imperceptibility, in this idea that it was there before, and obviously, Locke would disagree with this because he believes in the blank tablet. He would still disagree if the blank stone tablet had veins because they do not imply universal assent. It all comes back to universal assent.
The importance of the block of Marble example used by Leibniz is to show that universal assent cannot define innateness. Leibniz is simply posing the question of whether it is so that the human soul is so empty that it requires images of the external world in order for it to fill itself. Leibniz argues that the external world does not dictate the soul. Because two individuals cannot wholly be alike they must differ somehow( Leibniz 297). Is the soul that empty? Is the soul full of nothing (Leibniz 297)? Leibniz does not think so. Whereas even Locke would say, no, there is some substance to the soul. Moreover, because there is something there, that implies that there has to be something innate within the soul. I think Locke may have agreed with each other. However, they would still argue about universal assent since Leibniz does not try to prove that the soul can consent. However, he leans into it and proves that the imperceptible happens around us, and we only see the outline. With reflection, there is a predisposition toward one way rather than another.
Works Cited
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. Preface to the New Essays. The Continental Rationalists. Electronic Edition, 1703, https://library-nlx-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/xtf/view?docId=rationalists/rationalists.05.xml;chunk.id=div.leibniz.pes.1047;toc.depth=1;toc.id=div.leibniz.pes.38;brand=default.
John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book I, Philosophical Texts. Electronic Edition., 1989, https://library-nlx-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/xtf/view?docId=lbh/lbh.01.xml;chunk.id=div.britphil.v27.6;toc.depth=1;toc.id=div.britphil.v27.6;brand=default.